Proportional Representation (Rationale)
The current system of party primaries is a failure. It is too easy to strategically select which party’s primary to vote in for the purpose of selecting nominees more aligned with one’s own values, regardless of actual party affiliation or preference. This deprives the party’s actual supporters of the ability to choose their own candidates. Such manipulation is also done in competitive races to saddle the opposition with an unpopular nominee, thus creating the situation that many primary voters are deliberately selecting the candidate they think is the worst!
Political parties’ lack of control over who their candidates are opened the door to hijacking of the major parties by movements too extreme or foolish to win elections honestly: we have seen this with the DSA (Democratic Socialists of America) in the Democrats and MAGA in the Republicans.
The rationale for primaries is that they are a necessary check on dominance of the system by an unaccountable elite, and the associated corruption (the “smoke-filled rooms”). But this is only a problem because there are almost always only two viable options (the “duopoly”). In proportional representation, there are many viable options, with no vote wasted and many parties and many ideas represented. For example, in the Netherlands, there are currently seventeen parties with seats in the lower house. Competition is strong. If a party nominates a bunch of reprobates, voters can and do simply vote for a different, ideologically similar one.
A major drawback for some countries with PR, as the Netherlands example suggests (which has been a very persistent problem in Israel and Italy) is that parties in double-digit numbers, with distinct leaders and agendas, have great difficulty forming a governing coalition. But this is only true for a parliamentary system, in which there must be a prime minister who can command support of a majority of legislators. In our presidential system, it is not necessary to be able to assemble a coalition which can hold a House majority. Representatives can simply propose legislation as individuals, to receive yea or nay by each Representative, caucus, or coalition on its merits. The only exception to this is necessary legislation such as the budget; the lack of a single majority could lead to games of chicken between caucuses as each caucus tries to pass its most-preferred budget and smaller parties withhold their votes from a budget until it includes their priorities. But that happens constantly now! A budget has not been enacted through the proper statutory procedure since 1996! PR can hardly make matters worse in this regard.
Proportional representation has no strategic voting whatsoever. Even in multi-member districts, ranked choice, or Condorcet, there are opportunities to manipulate the system by having groups of voters not vote their honest preferences. As long as there are sufficient seats to avoid large discontinuities that are exploitable, the best strategy is always an honest vote. The system cannot be manipulated by boosting or excluding spoiler candidates.
In the current system, two large parties, each dominated by a single set of ideas, compete for control; the victors impose their will according to the desires of the party base. Ideas inconsistent with the precepts of both major parties, however meritorious, have no chance of a hearing. Much of the wide range of Americans’ ideologies and visions for the future is barely heard in DC.
Under proportional representation, many different parties with competing ideas win seats. Congress could not be dominated by a single majority party that ignores opposition ideas and amendments. This would lead to more stability in governance, as policy would no longer tip on Republicans getting one more or one less seat than Democrats. Passing legislation would require the support of a true majority, one that includes many different visions. The socialist left and radical right would be limited in their influence, because a centrist coalition could form and leave them both in the cold if they demand too much of their ideological allies. At the same time, they would have some influence, gaining a platform to speak to Americans on the merits of their unorthodox ideals. Just as our economic system does best at delivering low prices when there are many competing sellers, our political system does best at delivering solutions when there are many competing ideas.
These changes are within the power of Congress to make, as clearly intended by the Founders. Article I, Section 4 specifically states that “the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations”.
Proportional Representation (Mechanics)
The core principle of proportional representation is that the percentage of seats won by a political party should differ very little from the percentage of votes won by that party. There are variations in the algorithm for assigning seats (Droop quota, d’Hondt, etc.), but the simplest, most proportional approach is to minimize remainders: seats are allocated in the manner that minimizes the sum of the differences between vote share and seat share.
A concrete example: Ohio currently has 15 seats. In 2024, the total votes cast for US House in Ohio were 56.57% for Republicans and 43.43% for Democrats. Because of gerrymandered districts, this yielded 10 seats for Republicans and 5 for Democrats; Republicans won 66.67% of the House seats. (This phenomenon is not unique to Ohio or Republicans; gerrymandered districts in Illinois, Maryland, and New York give Democrats similarly disproportionate seats.) In proportional representation, the Republicans would have won 8 seats (53.33%) and the Democrats 7 (46.67%), as this minimizes the total difference between seat percentage and share percentage to . (To go to 9 R, 6 D would increase the total difference to 9.86%; 7 R, 8 D is obviously worse since the Republicans won more votes.)
States would be required to allow parties to retain recognition for the purpose of receiving votes if they received at least 1% of votes in the prior election; won one or more seats in the last election; or caused a shift in seat allocation due to their presence in an electoral alliance (see below). (That the second but not the first would occur becomes possible if the number of seats is increased.) Initially acquiring recognition would be by petition (like how it currently works in Ohio).
The enacting legislation would mandate that the process for filling of each party’s list may be selected by the party, in a manner in accordance with its own bylaws and procedures, from one of the following options: full selection of the lists by party officials, a primary conducted and paid for by the party in accordance with its own procedures, or a state-funded primary to select members of the party list (from districts, or at-large, as the party sees fit). This would not be required to be internally democratic in any way: for a party’s candidates to be selected solely by one person would be legal. Those who object to such processes would be entirely free to vote for other parties; the major parties, traditionally using primaries, would likely alienate voters if they tried to eliminate them. If primaries are to be used, it would also be wise to have a mechanism to allow candidates elected in a primary to vote (with some supermajority) to fill vacant slots or districts on the party list, and to remove candidates from the list if they are found to be plants or unfit for office.
The preference order for filling seats could be set by the party, determined by the voters (like the Swiss open-list system), or determined by vote share for the party in the districts for the primaries (i.e., the Green candidate from the district where the Greens won the most votes gets seated first, then the candidate with the district of the second-most Green votes, and so on). This is a minor consideration.
It should now be apparent why this policy should be tied to expanding the House: many low-population states cannot be reasonably proportionate under current seat numbers, which would undermine the purpose of the system. However, because of the population disparities between states, increasing the size of the House sufficiently to produce good proportionality in Wyoming would be unworkable; California would then have thousands of Representatives. Switzerland, with large differences in population between its cantons, has a similar problem, and my proposal is to adopt their solution, which is called the “apparentment”.
I prefer the term “party alliance”. Prior to the election, parties would be allowed to agree to combine their vote shares for the purpose of calculating proportionality, with seats then awarded after the election, within each such alliance, on the differential-minimizing rule. For example, consider Wyoming, if the House were to be expanded enough for Wyoming to have two, but not three, seats. Even if the Libertarian Party can secure 10% of the vote, that would be unlikely to yield any seats. However, they could choose whether to form a party alliance with Democrats or Republicans, and thus give influence to their voters (who would otherwise get no representation) if their vote share is decisive. Combining their 10% with the Democrats might push them over the resulting 25% threshold to split the delegation; combining their 10% with the Republicans might push the Democrats under 25% to produce a Republican sweep.1 Knowing this, Wyoming Republicans and Democrats would make concessions on how they will vote in Congress if elected to get the Libertarians on side, allowing libertarian citizens to have influence even if no seats are won. The same would be true for Greens, the Constitution Party, Solidarity, Forward, and any other new parties that would form to truly represent the people.
The full list of candidate names for each party would be required to be displayed in polling places, along with lists showing any party alliances in effect.
Expand the House
In 1911, the House of Representatives was set by statute to have 435 members. Since then, the population of the United States has more than tripled, ballooning the average district population from 210,328 to 761,169. This high number raises the cost barrier to campaign for a House seat and makes Representatives less accountable and less responsive to individual voters.2 More distinct communities must be packed together into each district, making some elections more of a demographic battle than a meaningful policy debate. There are also significant violations of population proportionality (“one person, one vote”) because the number of Representatives is insufficient to capture state population differences accurately, and because the lowest-population states cannot have less than one Representative (so Vermont and Wyoming, for example, are over-represented relative to other states, including Ohio).
The size of the House is set by law (with the Constitution only specifying a minimum district population, one which is tiny by modern standards). A simple act of Congress could increase the number of Representatives.
I support a size sufficient to give each state no less than two Representatives (for proportionality), in the range of 1000. However, I would support any increase to a maximum of 2000 or so. In addition to mitigating the problems discussed above, it would make the electoral college less disproportionate by shrinking the advantage each state gains from having two senators.
It is true that this would raise the costs of Representative and staff salaries and office expenses. However, it would do so less than linearly, because each Representative would be less powerful and responsible for fewer constituent issues. This is negligible relative to the DC budget anyway; the costs could be made up thousands of times over by improved governance quality.
Ranked Choice Voting For All Senators
Two explainers of RCV are linked here. These videos explain it as well.
The main benefit of RCV is to correct the spoiler problem and the resulting need for strategic voting. RCV does not do this perfectly, but no voting system can. This has the benefits discussed above in terms of more open elections with more real choices. RCV also encourages less abusive campaigning: attacking one candidate may bring their first-choice votes down, but those voters may still rank them second. Candidates with similar ideas, instead of death-warring for a limited pool of votes, have a strong incentive to cooperate, finding common ground and even endorsing each other for second preference. (While Condorcet is theoretically preferable, it is more complex (and susceptible to “burying”), and RCV has selected the Condorcet winner in more than 98% of those American elections in which it was used.)
This would not involve mandating “jungle” or top-n primaries such as are used in California, Washington, or Alaska.3 These do not solve the spoiler problem; they merely push it back to the primary in ways that can actually make the outcome less representative. In 2016, votes split between three Democrats in the primary resulted in two Republicans advancing to the general election and Washington’s first Republican treasurer in decades, despite more total votes for the Democrats. This is very easily abused.
Increasing the number of candidates going through to the general election does not solve the problem. Republicans and Democrats tend to claim all four slots, leading to little ideological diversity or real choice on Election Day (several ideologically similar candidates also worsens issues with center splits and non-monotonicity). In recent Alaska elections, the major parties have adopted a strategy of having their weaker entrants into the top four drop out too late to be replaced, negating the benefit of RCV among multiple candidates. Attempting to reject the concept of political party nominees is inconsistent with most major democracies and ultimately futile; political parties are a natural part of our political system due to strategic incentives.
Other Electoral Changes
I am opposed to much of the left’s “For the People Act” because it assumes that current negligible levels of electoral fraud will remain so if the incentive structure shifts. Same-day registration, for example, makes it more difficult to verify the identities of the people registering to vote and the accuracy of the information provided. Past incidents have shown that mail-in ballots are much more vulnerable to fraud than in-person voting (and it is impossible to check physical identification with mail-in ballots). Because it is impossible to have a verifiably secret mail-in ballot, such ballots open the door to harvesting, vote-buying, intimidation, and coercion.
Early voting costs taxpayer money to operate and prevents important arguments and events in the final month of the campaign from affecting voter choices. Whether that is a good trade-off should be for state voters and their representatives to determine, not Congress.
However, I support universal voter-verified paper ballots. It is impossible to prove (at least, to the satisfaction of a person without a master’s degree in computer science) that solely electronic election results are accurate. The step of verifying a paper ballot printed by a machine also reduces voter error.
Small-donor matching with public funds, as structured in the 2021 bill, is a bad idea for these reasons:
- $50,000 must be raised to be eligible for matching funds, which is much too high for outsider or minor-party candidates trying to break out of the catch-22 of needing money to get voter attention and needing voter attention to get money. The result: taxpayer money primarily funding established candidates within the two-party system. This is also too exploitable to be a useful threshold: under the current electoral system, a well-resourced organization could coordinate such donations for strategic reasons, e.g., a right-wing organization arranging for its members to contribute to a Green Party candidate so she can draw matching funds and hence votes that would have gone to a Democrat. It rewards dishonesty and punishes political entrepreneurship.
- Small contributions (up to $200) are matched at 6 to 1. A ratio that high is a powerful incentive for donors willing to give more to funnel their contribution through straw donors to multiply its effectiveness. For example, a father who split a $800 donation into $200 pieces to go through his wife and two college-aged sons would have his effective contribution increased from $2000 ($200 matched with $1200, plus the remaining $600) to $5600 (all $800 matched with $4800). Enforcement would be impossible at scale: it would require proving that a conduit knowingly received money for the specific purpose of donating it, i.e., proving mental state, which is very difficult and usually requires government snooping in private communication records. Such straw donations would inevitably become widespread, substantially undermining the goal of needing to appeal to many small donors, and raising the costs of the program greatly. This is not a hypothetical problem.
- Kickbacks are a similar issue: a donation’s matching funds could be used to buy overpriced campaigning services from someone with ties to the donor. This could lead to proliferation of fake candidacies existing only to extract matching funds from taxpayers.
- In a very real sense, modern campaign finance is an arms race. Parties and candidates are entirely capable of posting detailed information about their policies online, available for voter perusal, at a minimal cost. Everything beyond that is, arguably, zero-sum manipulation that does nothing to improve the quality of information available to voters. And the solution to an arms race is not to fuel all sides of it. Viewed this way, the entire matching structure is absurd: it is as if aliens tried to improve the security of both the USA and China by giving each side more weapons, on the basis that each side builds weapons to be more secure from the other.
If taxpayer financing of campaigns is to be done at all, it should be done by providing the same amount of money to each qualified candidate. Because the marginal benefit of campaign resources diminishes, this would level the playing field between well-resourced and outsider candidates, allowing people whose ideas aren’t already part of the mainstream to be heard. (To work well, this would require the electoral reforms I discussed above; without them, it would only greatly worsen issues arising from the spoiler problem.)
- This example assumes that only Republicans, Democrats, and Libertarians are competing, for simplicity. In reality we could expect there to be several more parties making similar deals. ↩︎
- It is true that PR systems with the party selecting or an at-large primary would eliminate the relevant tie, wherein each voter has a specific representative. However, as the need for constituent service would not disappear, this would be easily solved by having each state delegation, or each party’s Representatives within a state delegation, agree on some allocation of constituent service tasks. Representatives in this model have an obvious interest in keeping their party’s vote share high in their state. ↩︎
- These primaries in Alaska are often mistakenly conflated with ranked choice voting. In fact, how candidates for the general election are selected is a separate question from how the general election winner is determined. Alaska’s general election uses ranked choice; its primaries do not. ↩︎